News : Indonesia Military - Komando Information

   
Indonesia's regular army, navy and air force have a total strength of over 350,000. Although quantitatively larger than the militaries of neighboring countries, the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia: TNI) is qualitatively inferior to regional rivals such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The Indonesian Navy in particular suffers from outdated platforms, many of which are of limited operational utility or have been mothballed. This deficiency in equipment and the various internal insurgencies that the military has been deployed to combat explain why Indonesia's strategic doctrine since independence has stressed low-intensity warfare and guerrilla operations against any invading enemy, rather than an emphasis on conventional warfare. The TNI has extensive experience of counter-insurgency warfare having waged long-running campaigns against non-state groups in East Timor, Aceh and Papua.

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The Indonesian public, dissatisfied with weak civilian leadership, has returned prestige and respect to the military, which has regained much of the stature and political power (albeit behind the scenes) that it enjoyed under Suharto.  The military, after several years of internal struggle to define its role in a more democratic society, has been accepted by the government and population as serious about reform. The civilian minister of defense, Juwono Sudarsono, has established new guidelines designed to gradually assert greater civilian control over the military. These include centralized equipment purchases at the Department of Defense, and a parliamentary law requiring divestiture of the military business empire to civilian control, which the military leadership advanced from 2009 to 2007. At least two attempts to purchase Russian Mi-17 helicopters by army and navy foundations have run into intense scrutiny as corruption and inept negotiations brought the acquisition process to public attention. Since then, the minister of defense has centralized all arms procurement in the Department of Defense. Henceforth neither the armed forces headquarters nor the various military services will separately make weapons purchases.

The FY2005 defense budget is 10 per cent higher than FY2004, rising to approximately USD2.3 billion. This is still insufficient to fund the armed forces which, as a result of this, realizes two-thirds of its income from its own business empire. Both the navy and air force chiefs have previously informed parliament that their services were at very low readiness levels because of a lack of funding from the central government, as well as the US embargo on the sale of combat systems and 'lethal' equipment. Resumption of large-scale combat in Aceh in May 2003 led the government to provide the TNI with almost IDR2 trillion (USD225 million) in additional funding to pay for operations and support. The Aceh campaign was Indonesia's largest military operation since its 1975 invasion of East Timor, with approximately 50,000 military personnel and police involved.

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The armed forces have turned to different suppliers - including Russia, the Netherlands, and South Korea - to circumvent arms sales boycotts by its traditional Western suppliers. These boycotts are being slowly lifted amid international competition for closer military co-operation with Indonesia, and greater civilian control over the TNI. The paucity of transport capability in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami moved the US to end the embargo on non-lethal military sales and to reinstate foreign military financing (FMF), which reduces the cost of government-to-government purchases, for military sales. The embargo on "lethal" sales will remain until Indonesia makes progress on human rights cases from the 1999 East Timor violence, and resolution of the 2002 murder of two American teachers in Papua. Washington renewed Indonesia's eligibility for funding under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program in late February 2005, and is under greater pressure to reinstate closer military-to-military ties following a Sino-Indonesian agreement for co-ordinated defense production in July 2005 and a Russo-Indonesian agreement on defense co-operation signed in September 2005.

TNI Reform

Previously, a constitutional provision backed by legislative law called 'dual function' (dwi fungsi) legitimized a political role for the armed forces, as well as the more traditional roles of internal security and national defense. However, the dwi fungsi role of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia: TNI) was effectively ended in the late 1990s. Separation of police from the armed forces, and a requirement for military officers to retire or resign before taking civilian government positions will have a major impact on the role of the armed forces in Indonesian society.

Yet the military still faces the major challenge of regaining the respect of the population in order to carry out their missions of national defense and domestic stability. The armed forces are likely to move slowly but steadily towards greater reform, but at their own pace and towards their own objectives. The present generation of TNI leaders continues to insist that change be orderly and that they remain sole arbiters of the preservation of national security. Its leadership also made it clear that the institution would no longer serve as a political tool of individuals in government.

The TNI has gone to great lengths to ensure that some aspects of the institution remain sacrosanct. These include internal discipline, the pervasive military business empire and the army's territorial organization. Demands from more radical democratizes that the military dismantle its territorial apparatus were hampered by the fact that there remains little viable alternative to existing military-dominated structures in rural Indonesia. The TNI is also being forced to give up its former host of private enterprises by 2009, leaving the military with a probable budget shortfall. Private companies previously provided some two thirds of TNI funding.

Senior Indonesian military officers view their primary role as being the maintenance of Indonesia's unity, particularly against threats deriving from racial, religious, ethnic and class-based conflict. The 2003 Defense White Paper reasserted the military's role in maintaining domestic stability and ratified the territorial system's continued importance.

Funding

Government funding of the TNI covers only 30 per cent of its costs. The other 70 per cent has come from off-budget sources, a situation that not only adds to problems of transparency, accountability and corruption, but also undermines the TNI's defense role by diverting focus to seeking funds. The lack of an adequate budget for salaries, training, education, welfare, maintenance and purchase of equipment has undermined discipline, morale, operational capacity and, ultimately, the extent of reform. The national taxation and revenue systems as well as budget priorities must still be improved before the military can be fully funded by the defense budget. Until then, the military will continue to rely on its secretive business empire for two thirds of its operational and equipment funding.
In an unusually frank public testimony, in late 2004 the chiefs of Indonesia's three military services reported abysmal states of readiness caused by poor maintenance, shortages of spare parts and a lack of modern technical equipment.
Presidential control
The Indonesian armed forces' chain of command is highly centralized and traditionally has been strictly controlled by the president. The election of retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president in 2004 is expected to secure an excellent relationship between the president and the military leadership. Susilo remains well connected within the military, while his time as co-ordinating minister for political and security affairs under Megawati improved his status within the military elite. Parliament must now approve the selection of armed forces commander-in-chief and the national police chief, but pending legislation will remove this provision and allow the president to appoint these positions after consulting with, but not requiring the approval of, parliament.
In April 1999 the national police were removed from the armed forces and placed under the direct control of the Office of the President. The national police chief and the armed forces commander-in-chief now enjoy equal status and access to the president.





Civilian control
President Wahid appointed the first civilian in 40 years to the post of defense minister in 1999. Since then presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have continued to appoint civilians to that post. Although the defense minister is not in the chain of command, the parliament's 2004 military law recognizes the principle of civilian control of the military and the 2005 draft law will effect a major change that will subordinate the armed forces headquarters to the Department of Defense. The name of the department was changed (dropping the 'and Security' from its former name) to the Department of Defense to symbolize a continued reduction in the political role of the military establishment.
Under the Indonesian structure the chain of command for all troop functions runs through the commander-in-chief, while the Department of Defense has responsibility for most budget, doctrine, and planning functions as well as relations with foreign military forces.
Doctrine and Strategy
The Indonesian armed forces' principal doctrinal concepts, derived from the country's historical experience and geography, are:
"    National resilience (ketahanan nasional), which emphasizes the need for Indonesia to build its economic, social and political strength through self-sufficiency and national resourcefulness;
"    Total people's defense and security (hankamrata), based on the notion that the civilian population and infrastructure are vital components of the national defense strategy; and
"    The archipelagic doctrine (wawasan nusantara), which stresses the vital importance of maintaining the integrity and unity of Indonesia's island and maritime territory.
The 'New Paradigm' defense doctrine relinquished much of the internal security mission to the police in favor of refocusing on traditional defense against potential external threats. However, the inability of the national police effectively to assume that mission, and the incidence of internal violence since 1998, has caused the TNI to re-examine its responsibility for internal security and to ask parliament and the president to reassign some security missions to the military. Also, while after the fall of Suharto the TNI agreed in principle to a gradual reduction in the territorial command system, it has now stated as a matter of defense policy that the territorial system will continue in effect for the indefinite future. The military's controversial dual civil-military function (dwi-fungsi), which gave the armed forces a political role as well as a defense role, has been officially eliminated from the armed forces doctrine as part of military reform. The new doctrine, called Paradigma Baru (New Paradigm) stresses the military's support of democracy and civilian rule.
Military-to-military Relations
Throughout 2003 there was considerable debate in Australia and the US on the issue of restoring 'normal' military-to-military relations with the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia: TNI), which were halted by both countries after the army-supported violence surrounding East Timor's separation from Indonesia in 1999.
Those favoring re-introduction of military-to-military ties question how Indonesia can be a real partner in the 'war on terror' without a working relationship with the military. Selective re-engagement has the potential not only to aid governments in fighting terrorism, but also help counter and contain broader regional threats emanating from drug trafficking, piracy, international crime and the transnational movement of illegal immigrants.
The counter-argument is that the TNI's poor human rights record, its lackluster efforts to meet its promises to punish those responsible for violence in East Timor, and a continuing attitude of impunity from both outside and domestic criticism, makes it anathema to powerful political and human rights interests in many countries.
The June 2004 announcement by the U.S. Department of Justice indicting an alleged Papuan separatist leader for the murder of two American teachers allowed the U.S. to begin normalization of military-to-military relations in March 2005. Australia has already restored some military programs with the TNI but, like the U.S., is moving slowly in a highly politicized arena.
Civil-Military Relations

By the late 1990s the military's former prestige held under the autocratic regime of Suharto had plummeted owing to revelations of past human rights violations, political misbehavior and involvement in the East Timor violence. It successfully regained much of its power and influence under the Megawati government, largely because of the ineffectiveness of civilian institutions such as parliament, political parties and the democratic civilian government. The fact that a retired army general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, defeated the incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri in the 2004 election reflects widespread public sentiment for more disciplined government leadership. There should be no doubt that Indonesia's armed forces are likely to remain the most powerful element in society for the foreseeable future, particularly given President Susilo's close relationship with the military.

Human Rights

Indonesia's human rights record is poor. However, international and domestic pressure during the 1990s forced the government and armed forces to implement some measures aimed at improving their performance in this area. The government created the National Human Rights Commission (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia: Komnas HAM), which won a degree of respect for the surprising amount of independence demonstrated in investigating abuses such as the massacre of unarmed demonstrators in Dili, East Timor (November 1991) and in Aceh (1998-99). Senior army officers have clearly tried since the early 1990s to prevent a repetition of the Dili incident. Military personnel responsible for Dili and other incidents (such as the shooting of unarmed protesters in Ngabang, West Kalimantan, in April 1996) have been court-martialed and sentenced to prison terms.

Human rights training was integrated throughout the armed forces during the 1990s. Assistance from the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), international governments and non-governmental organizations provided the Indonesian military with the foundations for good practice, although their actions during East Timor's clamor for independence in 1999 provided little evidence to suggest that these standards were being followed. The problem lies in the field, where supervision of subordinates is lax and the chain of command at its weakest. Coupled with reluctance to impose discipline on miscreants, poor leadership remains one of the military's greatest weaknesses.

It is clear that embedding the concept of human rights within many state institutions, notably the armed forces and the police, is a constant struggle. In February 2004 the U.S. State Department issued its annual human rights report which criticized Indonesia's lack of progress in this area. The Indonesian authorities responded robustly, pointing to the U.S. record in detaining those it accused of terrorism in Guantanamo Bay without access to justice, the U.S. record on racial inequality and past actions towards its indigenous inhabitants.

Source: Jane's Information Group

A.    Leadership

Minister of Defense - Juwono Sudarsono

When President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took office, he wanted to place a non-military man at the helm of the Department of Defense.  He recently chose Juwono Sudarsono for the position-an expert in defense  and capable of understanding reform in the Indonesian Armed Forces [TNI]. 

Sudarsono actually held the position of Defense Minister once before, during Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency.  Under Wahid, Sudarsono was Indonesia's first civilian Defense Minister, a soft-spoken intellectual who served as Education Minister under former president B.J. Habibie and predecessor, Suharto.  However, he suffered a minor stroke in mid-1999 and was replaced by Mahfud Md. a few months later.  It was during that time period [1999] when the U.S. Congress cut defense ties with Indonesia over human rights abuses in East Timor.

During his role as Indonesia's Ambassador to London [2003], Sudarsono maintained that the alleged human rights atrocities were also carried out by GAM [Free Aceh Movement], and that actions of the Indonesian military had to seen in the context of a "war situation."  He told the media that Jakarta was keeping groups like Human Rights Watch out of the Aceh because they were biased against the Indonesian operation, and he defended some of the violence carried out by government forces. 

Considered a leading thinker on the Indonesian military, Sudarsono was educated at Berkeley and the London School of Economics and was the former deputy governor of Lemhanas [The National Resilience Institute]. 

As Indonesia's new Defense Minister, Sudarsono has put the resumption of military ties with Washington at the top of his priorities. 
Source: Web-Only Interview, TIME, 28 February 2000, vol. 155 no. 8
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2000/0228/indonesia.sudarsono.html


Armed Forces Commander in Chief:  Air Chief Marshal Djoko Suyanto
   
http://www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=6524

Air Marshal Djoko Suyanto is seen as a moderate who is unlikely to make dramatic moves on military reform.

During hearings over the nomination, Djoko Suyanto vowed to keep the military out of politics and pursue reforms, though he gave no details.

He is the first air force commander nominated for the top military job.
Source: Radio Australia
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/news/stories/s1565225.htm

Biography Data:

Biodata as carried in Banjarmasin Post, photograph from Media Indonesia:

Name: Djoko Soeyanto, SIP (Political Science Degree)
Rank: Air Chief Marshall
Date of Birth: 2 December 1950, Madiun, East Java.
Religion: Muslim
Married to Ratna Sinar Sari

Education:
Indonesian Air Force Academy - 1973
Pilot Training School - 1975
Royal Australian Air Force Flying Instructor Course - 1980
Test Pilot Course - 1982
Indonesian Air Force Unit Command School (Sekkau) - 1982
F-5 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course - 1983
Indonesian Air Force Staff and Command School (Seskoau) - 1990
Australian Joint Services Staff and Command College - 1995
Department of Defense (modern management course) - 1997
National Defense Institute - 1999

Career:
Commander 14 Squadron, Iswahyudi (F-5 fighters) - 1990
Commander Jayapura Airbase - 1992
Assistant for Operations, Sector I/National Air Defense Command, Halim - 1994
Commander Sector I/National Air Defense Command - 1999
Commander II Air Force Operations Command, Makassar - 2001
Assistant for Operations to KSAU - 2003
KSAU - 2004/2005

Jakarta Post Interviews New TNI Commander Air Chief Marshall Djoko Suyanto
SEP20060203111002 Jakarta The Jakarta Post (Internet Version-WWW) in English 03 Feb 06
[Interview with Djoko Suyanto by the Jakarta Post's Soeryo Winoto

What is your main agenda for the TNI?
National reform and internal reform within the TNI is the base. Internal reforms cover many aspects. TNI members are prohibited from entering into practical politics. In the future, internal reform must be able to put TNI in the right position, as required by the state's administrative system.

It is true that there has been strong demand by the people that TNI get out of politics. But in reality, there is a strong drive within the TNI that has also contributed to the internal reform movement. Remember when the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) scheduled the TNI to leave the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Assembly in 2009. But Pak Tarto (outgoing TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto) said that in 2004 everything would finish, and the TNI left the MPR and DPR in 2004, five years earlier than scheduled.

The next item on the agenda is promoting human rights. It is the duty of the TNI Chief and his Commanders to promote the values of human rights among TNI soldiers.

How will the TNI implement human rights values?
It is a process. It is impossible for human rights values to be implemented properly by all layers of the TNI -- from generals to low-ranking soldiers -- just because the chief shouts about it. But the fact that the TNI has sincerely promoted the values of human rights internally is something that deserves appreciation. Human rights are taught at every level of education among TNI members. Every commander has a reference book on human rights.

Military law rules that any use or deployment of military personnel must be based on state policy or on a political decision made by the government, with the approval or knowledge of the House of Representatives. In this way nobody will dub the TNI a troublemaker. In short, regarding human rights promotion, the law guarantees that there is nothing to worry about with the presence of the TNI.

What about TNI weaponry and the welfare of soldiers?
Let's look at Singapore. It is a small country that has good military forces with adequate weaponry. Thus it protects itself from attack by other countries. Singapore is at the ideal level in this context. While Indonesia is far from ideal.

In such a situation, the ability to lobby the government (by the TNI chief) is crucial. How much money can the government set aside for the military budget? With that much money the chief should be able to make use of the forces at a maximum capacity. Let's take the Air Force as an example. Only 40 percent of our Air Force strength is ready in case of emergency.

How about military businesses?
Speaking of military businesses, I would say that Law No. 34/2004 determines this.

In the past there were always claims that the businesses were undertaken for the welfare of military personnel; housing for widows of soldiers killed, insurance and health services for soldiers. Now that everything is based on the law we must carefully separate individual businesses from institutional businesses. In 2004, a joint team was set up to list the businesses run by the TNI. The team members consist of personnel from state companies, the Finance Ministry and the Corruption Eradication Commission, as well as the military. Now the ball is with the verification team, and I believe that the team will be very wise in correcting and selecting the military businesses. I mean that businesses that serve the interests of TNI members and their families must be retained.

The soldiers also need medical services and insurance, and those killed in battle must get insurance and the widows must get housing. We can't get that much money from the state budget, can we?

What about the regional military commands, like Kodim (military district commands) or Koramil (military subdistrict commands)?
Please be careful. The substance of the territorial policy is now much different from that in the past. In Bahasa Indonesia, I prefer using kewilayahan (area) to the old terminology "territorial", which could be misleading. As I mentioned before, our military strength is far from ideal to defend the archipelago. Therefore, the kewilayahan strategy is very relevant. Military officers in the regions must be more intuitive in detecting signs of security disturbances as early as possible, from outside or from within the regions. And thus they must be capable of taking prompt and relevant action to keep everything under control.

The kewilayahan strategy has nothing to do with the old paradigm of territorial design, where the military was used to back up the government's political maneuvers. Now, military officers in the regions can no longer arrest people at the request of the administration or political groups.

When it comes to security matters, officers in the regions should be able to hear a pin drop.

The point is that military officers in the regions must keep alert and sharpen their intuition for the sake of security, because a trivial thing can become a serious problem if not anticipated and dealt with properly at an early stage.

So, for the sake of security and defense, the presence of the military in regions, based on the kewilayahan strategy and concept, is relevant and acceptable.

Many observers are skeptical about your ability to handle other forces, especially the Army. How do you see this?
There are people who think the TNI chief can be everything and do anything. The TNI chief will never be able to work alone. He has eight staff members and assistants at headquarters. They are the best representatives of all the forces. They have been set up as a harmonious team.

There is the possibility that my knowledge of the Army or Navy is not that deep compared to theirs, because I am an Air Force man. I will certainly work together with qualified people.

Source: Jane's Information Group


Army Chief of Staff - General Djoko Santoso

Djoko Santoso was born in Solo, Central Java on September 8th, 1952. He spent most of his career at the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad). The 1975 Military Academy graduate was stationed at the 502 Infantry Battalion and the 330 Infantry Battalion. Santoso was Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division of the Army Strategic Reserves Command, Commander for Regional Military Command XVI/Pattimura, and Commander of the Jaya Regional Military. His latest posting was Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff.  Gen Santoso is considered to have been successful in handling the conflict in Maluku when he was Commander for the Security Restoration Operation Command (30 May 2002 - March 2003). Santoso also served as Vice Director of the Aceh Special Task Force for the tsunami disaster.  He holds a masters degree in management and has a background in intelligence.

Place and Date of Birth: Solo, 8 September 1952

Education:
Armed Forces Academy (1975)
Army Command School (1990)
Undergraduate in Social and Politics (1994)
Graduate School in Management (2000)

Tours of Duty:
Assistant for Community and Socio-Political Affairs (1998)
Chief of Staff Diponegoro Military Regional Command (2000)
Commander 2nd Division Army Reserve and Strategic Command (2001)
Commander Pattimura Military Regional Command (2002-2003)
Commander Jaya Military Regional Command (May 2003 - October 2003)
Assistant to Army Chief of Staff (2003-2005)
Army Chief of Staff (2005)

Source: Kompas, Translated by Virtual Information Center
http://www.kompas.co.id/utama/news/0502/25/072127.htm
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/02/17/news/jakarta.php

Photo: http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0205/31/utama/3005djok.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0205/31/utama/opsl01.htm&h=195&w=142&sz=9&tbnid=AGN-pMHjtpILtM:&tbnh=98&tbnw=71&hl=en&start=2&prev=/images%3Fq%3DDjoko%2BSantoso%26svnum%3D10%26hl%3Den%26lr%3D

Air Force Chief of Staff - Air Marshal Herman Prayitno
Herman Prayitno is a 1973 Air Force Academy graduate who became a pilot for transport aircraft and holds a qualification for C-130 Hercules. Prayitno also held a position as Commanding Officer for the Air Force Academy in Yogyakarta prior to his position as KSAU Assistant.

Place and Date of Birth: Yogyakarta, 9 January 1951

Education:
Terbuka University, Undergraduate in Political Science (1996)
Graduate School in Management (2001)
Armed Forces Academy (1973)
Flight School (1976)
Special Basic Course  (1998)
National Defense Institute (2000)

Tour of Duty:
Governor Air Force Academy (2001-2002)
Commander Air Force I Operation Command
Assistant for Personnel to Air Force Chief of Staff (2003)
Commander Military Academy (2003-2004)
Vice Air Force Chief of Staff (2004-2006)
Air Force Chief of Staff (Feb 13th 2006 - Present)

Source: Media Indonesia, Translated by Virtual Information Center
http://www.mediaindo.co.id
http://www.tni-au.mil.id/organisasi.asp



Navy Chief of Staff - Admiral Slamet Subijanto

Place and Date of Birth: Mojokerto, 4 June 1951

Education:
Military Academy (1973)
Commander Course (1975)
Naval Gunfire Course (1976)
Advance Officer Course - Navigation (1977)
Course Korvet (1978)
NBCD Course, Netherlands (1979)
Sys. Weapon Communication Course, Netherlands (1979)
Navigation CTT, Den Helder (1979)
Ops. School, Holland (1980)
Command Team Training (1980)
Helicopter Direction, Netherlands (1980)
Command Post Exercise, Philindo (1981)
Advance Officer Course (1983)
Surface Ship Commander Course (1985)
Naval Academy (1988/89)
Operational Art. Yugoslavia (1990)
Armed Forces Staff and Command School (1993/94)
National Defense Institute (2000/01)

Tours of Duty:
Chief of Navigation KRI Thamrin (1974)
Chief of Naval Operation KRI Topak (1975)
KRI Nusatelu (1975)
KRI Teluk Sampit (1976)
Officer in Charge KRI Kompas (1977)
Officer in Charge KRI Siberau (1979)
Chief of Naval Operation KRI Rakata (1980)
KRI Ngurah Rai (1981)
Officer in Charge KRI Pulau Rani (1982)
Chief of Navigation KRI Ngurah Rai (1983)
Commander KRI Siliman (1984)
Chief of Naval Operation KRI Martadinata (1985)
Chief of Operation KRI Rencong (1988)
Commander KRI Pulau Ratewo (1989)
Navy Staff and Command School (1991)
Commander KRI Monginsidi (1994)
Expert Staff to Commander of Navy Eastern Fleet Command (1996)
Assistant for Strategic Operations to Navy Chief of Staff (1997)
Assistant for Planning and Budgeting for Commander of Navy Eastern Fleet Command (1998)
Assistant for Planning and Budgeting to Navy Chief of Staff (1999)
Assistant for General Planning (2000)
Commander Navy Command School (2002)
Commander Navy Eastern Fleet Command (2003)
Vice Governor National Defense Institute (2003)

Photo:  http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/s/slamet-soebijanto/slamet_soebijanto.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/s/slamet-soebijanto/index.shtml&h=200&w=145&sz=6&hl=en&start=10&um=1&tbnid=s_UTzc5-hyXqYM:&tbnh=104&tbnw=75&prev=/images%3Fq%3DIndonesia%2Bnavy%2BSlamet%2BSoebijanto%26svnum%3D10%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26rls%3DRNWN,RNWN:2006-39,RNWN:en%26sa%3DN

Armed Forces Overview

Military branches:    Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI): Army (TNI-AD), Navy (TNI-AL, includes Marines, Naval Air arm), Air Force (TNI-AU)
Military service age and obligation:    18 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscript service obligation - 2 years (2002)
Manpower available for military service:    males age 18-49: 60,543,028 (2005 est.)
Manpower fit for military service:    males age 18-49: 48,687,234 (2005 est.)
Manpower reaching military service age annually:    males: 2,201,047 (2005 est.)
Military expenditures - dollar figure:    $1.3 billion (2004)
Military expenditures - percent of GDP:    3% (2004)

Source: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/id.html
   
Defense Modernization
The Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia: TNI) has undergone significant changes since the resignation of Suharto as president in 1998. The most important of these has been its withdrawal from day-to-day political activity and strict neutrality in the democratic process. In 2004 the military relinquished its reserved seats in parliament and the regional assemblies, and the constitution in principle now requires military personnel to retire or resign from the armed forces before running for elective or appointive civilian government posts. During Suharto's rule thousands of military personnel filled civilian government positions at every level.
Military reform in Indonesia still has a long way to go if the TNI is effectively to relinquish its influence on large sections of the Indonesian political and private spheres. For instance, the military has made it clear that it does not intend to dismantle its territorial organization and structure, from which its huge military financial empire of legitimate and opaque businesses operates. Laws enacted in October 2004 require the military to divest itself from this business empire within five years, and in April 2005, the TNI commander-in-chief announced that divestiture could in fact begin in 2007.
Ongoing defense studies had in January 2006 however only identified a dozen military businesses to be shifted to civilian government control. Virtually all military businesses - 219 of them according to an October 2005 Department of Defense study - are considered as cooperatives rather than corporations and will remain under military control, as they provide benefits to troops rather than profits on capital.
Defense Structure
The TNI consists of a tri-service national command and the three traditional branches of the armed forces - army, navy, and air force. TNI Headquarters and the headquarters of the Navy and Air Force are located in a large compound in far southeast Jakarta (the army retains its headquarters on Merdeka Square, close to the presidential palace). The army is the dominant service in numbers, influence and power, while the navy and air force are undersized for the defense requirements of a huge archipelagic nation.
Chain of Command

Indonesia's military chain of command runs from the President, who is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, directly to the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief. All troop functions run through the Commander-in-Chief. The Department of Defense is a separate entity outside the military command structure, and as such, the Minister of Defense does not fall within the operational chain of command. The Defense Department's responsibilities include joint planning, doctrine, budgetary affairs, strategic studies and supervision over most international arms purchases, as well as relations with foreign military forces.
Presidential Control
The Indonesian armed forces' chain of command is highly centralized and has traditionally been strictly controlled by the president. The election of retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president in 2004 secured an excellent relationship between the president and the military leadership. President Yudhoyono is believed to be well respected within the military elite following his time as coordinating minister for political and security affairs under former President Megawati. Parliament approves the selection of the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief and the National Police Chief, but pending legislation will remove this provision and allow the President to appoint these positions after consulting with, but not requiring the approval of, parliament.
Civilian Control
While the transition to democracy includes a policy of eventual civilian control over the TNI, that goal is many years away. President Wahid was the first in 40 years to appoint a civilian to the post of Defense Minister in 1999. Although the Defense Minister does not fall under the operational chain of command, Parliament's 2004 military law recognizes the principle of civilian control of the military and the 2005 draft law will effect a major change that will subordinate the armed forces headquarters to the Department of Defense.
Doctrine and Strategy
The Indonesian armed forces' principal doctrinal concepts, derived from the country's historical experience and geography, are:
"    National resilience (ketahanan nasional), which emphasizes the need for Indonesia to build its economic, social and political strength through self-sufficiency and national resourcefulness;
"    Total people's defense and security (hankamrata), based on the notion that the civilian population and infrastructure are vital components of the national defense strategy; and
"    The archipelagic doctrine (wawasan nusantara), which stresses the vital importance of maintaining the integrity and unity of Indonesia's island and maritime territory.
The doctrine called Paradigma Baru - New Paradigm, developed in 1998, stresses the military's support of democracy and civilian rule. As such, the military's controversial dual civil-military function (dwi-fungsi), which gave the armed forces a political role as well as a defense role, has been officially eliminated from the armed forces doctrine as part of the military reform process.
The 'New Paradigm' defense doctrine has also relinquished much of the internal security mission to the police in favor of refocusing on traditional defense. However, the inability of the national police to effectively assume that mission, and the incidence of internal violence since 1998, has caused the President to re-examine the TNI's responsibility for internal security, and in October 2005, President Yudhoyono directed the TNI to take a more pro-active role in counterterrorism operations.
According to Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono in 2005, reviews are needed of the TNI's intelligence, command and territorial doctrine to emphasize its commitment to improve each service's mission capability and focus on defense capacity rather than on assessments of external threats.
Although there is no official declaratory policy on strategic weapons, Indonesia is a member of all the relevant treaties on non-proliferation. The country ratified the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1979, and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Indonesia was also among the 10 signatories of the 1995 Bangkok Treaty which established a regional nuclear weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia.
Indonesia also signed the Chemical Weapons Convention upon its opening in 1993 (ratified in 1998) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972 (ratified in 1992).
Strategic Weapons
Indonesia has no strategic weapons.
Ballistic Missiles
Indonesia has no ballistic missile capability and no current intention to acquire them.
Nuclear Weapons
Indonesia has no nuclear weapons capability, and has demonstrated no intention to acquire them. However, the country has largely succeeded in developing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. Two uranium mines are established in West Kalimantan, and Indonesia has been able to mill and process the ore and convert the yellowcake. Three research reactors are in operation in the country (Bandung, Yogyakarta and Serpong), and a fourth is planned.
Economic growth and declining oil production have motivated an ambitious nuclear power plant program, with an ultimate goal of 12 power plants. Construction on the first plant is expected to commence by 2010 and the facility should become operational by 2016. The locations of the plants have not been decided, but Indonesia's proximity to tectonic fault lines are a concern for any possible nuclear facilities.
Biological Weapons
Indonesia has no biological weapons and there are no published plans for the acquisition of such weapons.
Chemical Weapons
According to the Geneva Protocol (1971), to which Indonesia has subscribed, it may not make use in war of 'asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases'. However, security forces used non-persistent choking agents and CS gas in East Timor in the 1980s and have the capability to use them in other counter-insurgency operations. Indonesia does not have a chemical weapons program, and has not been known to manufacture or acquire any vesicant, nerve or blood agents.
Assessment of Covert Programs
There is no evidence to suggest the existence of any covert programs for the development of either strategic weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Should Jakarta adopt a radical shift in its nuclear policy, Indonesia could pursue uranium enrichment and weaponization programs. However, Indonesia operates under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and has as yet pursued only peaceful applications for its nuclear technology.
Chain of Command




















The TNI consists of a tri-service national command and the three traditional branches of the armed forces - army, navy, and air force. TNI Headquarters and the headquarters of the Navy and Air Force are located in a large compound in far southeast Jakarta (the army retains its headquarters on Merdeka Square, close to the presidential palace). The army is the dominant service in numbers, influence and power, while the navy and air force are undersized for the defense requirements of a huge archipelagic nation.
The Department of Defense is a separate entity outside the military chain of command. While the transition to democracy includes a policy of eventual civilian control over the TNI, that goal is many years in the future. Nevertheless the Department of Defense (Department Pertahanan - DepHan) has increasingly strong control over national defense strategy, budgetary control and defense procurement.
Indonesia's military chain of command runs from the president, who is the supreme commander of the armed forces, directly to the armed forces commander-in-chief. The minister of defense is not in the operational chain of command. The Defense Department's responsibilities include joint planning, budgetary affairs, strategic studies and supervision over most international arms purchases obtained through government funds. The parallel military and defense laws being prepared for parliamentary approval will place the armed forces under the Department of Defense, and the national police under the Department of Home Affairs.
While the command structure is comparable with that of many other countries, it also has distinctive characteristics, reflecting the Indonesian armed forces' key doctrines, particularly total people's defense and security, and the army's territorial command system, which extends military presence down to the village level.
B.    Army
ARMY SUMMARY
Summary
STRENGTH
280,000
INFANTRY
Battalion × 70
AIRBORNE INFANTRY
Battalion × 13
SPECIAL FORCES
Group × 3
ARMOUR
Battalion × 8
ARTILLERY
Battalion × 10
AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY
Battalion × 10
ENGINEERS
Battalion × 10
AVIATION/HELICOPTER
Squadron × 2
Assessment
Indonesia's army has benefited from a greater emphasis than either the air force or navy. Overall, the military's involvement in numerous counter-insurgent and counter-guerrilla campaigns within Indonesia has ensured intensive and prolonged combat experience for the army, aiding its battle readiness. However, as the service has traditionally been oriented towards internal security tasks, there are doubts over its capability to resist any aggression from overseas.
In the 1990s there was an effort to develop limited capabilities for conventional warfare using more modern equipment, but the army's principal focus will remain on holding the disparate Indonesian republic together in the face of continuing challenges from separatist movements and socio-ethnic tensions. The national police, separated from the armed forces on 1 April 1999, has the primary mission for internal security, although the army retains a major support role.
The reputation of the army was badly damaged by its role in promoting and supporting anti-independence groups during the months immediately before and after the August 1999 ballot to determine East Timor's future. Inability or unwillingness of the army to maintain security in the province led to the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force in mid-September 1999, to restore order, disarm militia forces, and assist in providing humanitarian assistance. In recent years the army has made a concentrated effort to improve the performance of its troops in dealing with civilians in areas of conflict, particularly in Aceh and Papua.
Deployments, tasks and operations
Role and Deployment
Under the former dwi fungsi (dual function) doctrine, the Indonesian armed forces were assigned significant roles in socio-economic development as well as the traditional role of defending the country against internal and external threats. Members of the armed forces, particularly the army, were assigned to key posts in the civilian government infrastructure and assumed a role in virtually every aspect of the nation's society. This system was the bedrock of support for the Suharto regime.
Responding to demands for political reform in Indonesia, the dwi fungsi mission was dropped and under its "New Paradigm" the army specifically rejects an active political role in society. To further emphasize the change in doctrine, armed forces headquarters eliminated the number-three position of chief of staff for territorial affairs, and downgraded it to a two-star billet. Military personnel must now retire before taking civilian government posts, and the military has rejected any role in party politics. During the 2005 cycle of local elections, most retired military personnel running for office failed of election. Nevertheless, civilian political parties actively solicit the support of former military personnel, and the military has regained lost prestige and remains the most cohesive and powerful element of Indonesian society.
Army units are dispersed widely throughout the country. Each Kodam and Korem has at least one territorial infantry battalion assigned. High-quality combat units are concentrated in KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS, which although largely based on Java serve as a rapid reaction force. The army has historically been extensively involved in counter-insurgency operations in East Timor, Papua and Aceh, as well as in restoring and maintaining civil order during and after flare-ups of violence throughout Indonesia. However, following the separation of the police from the armed forces and its assumption of the primary responsibility for internal stability, the army has been relegated to a support role.
Recent and Current Operations
Indonesia is particularly proud that it has participated in a wide variety of UN peacekeeping missions since the Congo operation of the early 1960s. It provided the largest national contingent to the UN operation in Cambodia and sent contingents to support UN efforts in Bosnia, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Georgia and the Iraq/Kuwait border. Indonesian police personnel were included in the missions to Bosnia and Croatia. In November 2006 Indonesia deployed a 850-man joint army/marine corps task force to the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon (UNIFIL-2). Resumption of the UN support mission is a major foreign policy and military objective for Indonesia.
During its chairmanship of ASEAN in early 2004, Indonesia proposed the formation of a regional peacekeeping force, which could be deployed to crisis areas in Southeast Asia. However, given the organization's founding principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, it is unsurprising that no progress has been made on this issue.
As of January 2007 Indonesia military deployments in support of the UN totaled 1,029 troops and 22 military observes. They are as follows:
"    MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo) - 179 troops and nine military observers
"    UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) - nine military observers
"    UNMIL (Liberia) - three military observers
"    UNMIS (Sudan) - four military observers
"    UNOMIG (Georgia) - four military observers
"    UNIFIL-2 (Lebanon) - 850 troops
Command and Control
The chain of command for the Indonesia Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)) runs from the President, who is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces, directly to the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief (Panglima TNI). The operational chain of command runs from the Panglima TNI to the operational commands of the three military services. The Minister of Defense is not in the operational chain of command. His responsibilities include joint planning, budgetary affairs, strategic studies and supervision over most international arms purchases obtained through government funds. Calls for military reform include eventually placing the armed forces under the Department of Defense. The three service Chiefs of Staff report to the TNI C-in-C.

While the command structure is comparable with that of many other countries, it also has distinctive characteristics, reflecting the Indonesian armed forces' key doctrines, particularly total people's defense and security, and the army's territorial command system, which extends military presence down to the village level.
The Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat (TNIAD)) is supported by a Vice Chief and the Army Headquarters staff.
Army Organization
The total strength of the Indonesian Army is about 280,000. It is divided into "tactical" and "territorial" forces and a training command.
Territorial Forces
The army territorial units reflect the civilian government structure and are organized under 12 military regional commands, Komando Daerah Militer (KODAM). These are further subdivided into KOREM (provincial) and KODIM (district) commands. These territorial units account for the bulk of the army's personnel (about 140,00 to 150,000 troops). The majority of the territorial forces are infantry units. Each KODAM has at least one infantry battalion under direct command and each KOREM controls one or more infantry battalions. Army units are dispersed widely through the archipelago.
In late 2003 it was announced that 10 battalions had been re-designated Raider Battalions. Eight of these were found from KODAM forces and two from KOSTRAD. The intention seems to be to produce more capable and flexible units for KODAM commanders to employ.
Order of Battle
Infantry    70 × Battalions
Airborne Infantry    13 × Battalions 1
Special Forces    3 × Battalions (SF groups), 1 × counter-terror unit; training centre
Armor    8 × Battalions
Artillery    10 × Field Artillery Regiments
Air Defense Artillery    10 × Battalions
Engineers    10 × Battalions
Aviation/Helicopter    2 × Squadrons
Note:
1.    At least one airborne battalion has reportedly lost its airborne designation because of a lack of training in airborne skills and operations.